Beyond Regulatory Capture: Reconceptualising Principal–Agent Accountability in Multilevel Governance Architectures Under Polycrisis Conditions

Abstract

Contemporary multilevel governance frameworks exhibit persistent accountability deficits that conventional principal–agent models inadequately capture, particularly under compounding polycrisis pressures observed since 2020. This study critically reassesses the regulatory capture thesis by integrating institutional layering theory with deliberative accountability mechanisms, drawing on a mixed-methods design comprising comparative case analysis across eighteen OECD jurisdictions and structured elite interviews with 94 senior policy practitioners. Findings demonstrate that standard oversight hierarchies systematically misalign incentive structures when cross-scalar authority is fragmented across supranational, national, and subnational tiers. The study proposes a revised Nested Accountability Equilibrium (NAE) framework, revealing that adaptive co-governance arrangements significantly outperform hierarchical mandates in sustaining democratic legitimacy across volatile policy environments. Implications for institutional design, executive agency discretion, and legislative oversight reform are discussed.